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ABSTRACT 
Containerization as a means of cargo transport represents the most 
progressive technological advance in shipping today. The efficiency that 
containerization presents to shippers has made it the preferred means of 
cargo transport by sea and land. As containerization continues to grow 
throughout the world, semi-autonomous public ports in the United States 
compete for larger shares of high valued cargo. Competition among ports has 
led to the extensive development of container handling facilities throughout 
the United States and created a certain degree of unneeded capacity. 
The cost of this overcapacity to society can be measured in financial 
waste, opportunity cost of land, and environmental damage from coastal 
development. Despite its political implications, no federal policy or 
management mechanism exists to solve the problem. 
This thesis demonstrates that overcapacity at container facilities exists 
and demands political attention as a public welfare issue. It is suggested that 
. , 
capacity analysis, if utilized by ports, can serve as a mechanism to prevent and 
correct the social inefficiencies of overcapacity from port competition. By 
utilizing a capacity monitoring and assessment tool similar to the method 
used in this thesis, government permit decision-makers and ports can 
produce tnore information to better make port development decisions. On a 
broad level, available capacity information can improve U.S. port facility 
development project planning. 
This document quantitatively demonstrates the extent of container 
terminal excess among large ports (100,000 + TEUs annually) along the U.S. 
ii 
mid-Atlantic port range and presents evidence of a continuing overcapacity 
problem. Evidence supports the hypothesis that significant overcapacity 
resulting in social costs does indeed exist and requires political attention as a 
societal issue. 
iii 
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OIAPTERONE 
PROBLEMS AND POLICY PERSPECilVES 
Inter-port competition for containerized cargo in the United States 
Mid-Atlantic port range has led to extensive investment in and development 
of container handling facilities. From the ports of Baltimore to Jacksonville 
(See Figure 1), the development of duplicate facilities is a result of 
competition for container cargo. Thus, it is suggested that overcapacity exists 
within port container facilities throughout the range. The ports in this study 
were selected because of the known competition among them 
(Containerisation International, 1987). In addition, the Mid-Atlantic range 
exhibits characteristics which are representative of typical container ports 
throughout the nation. Therefore, the results of this study could have policy 
implications in other U.S. ports and port ranges. 
Extreme overcapacity within a port and a range is symptomatic of 
inefficient port planning and coastal land use, and creates long-term 
environmental consequences associated with dredge and fill activity. As the 
mid-Atlantic container ports continue to develop and expand in order to 
accommodate a limited growth of cargo, the question of overcapacity must be 
addressed. 
To a certain extent, excess capacity among U.S. ports is a natural 
condition of the system. It provides for peak trade periods and for specialized 
uses such as occasional military berthing. Excess capacity also allows cargo 
growth potential so a port can remain competitive (National Research 
1 
FIGURE1 
MID-ATLANTIC PORTS STUDIED 
2 
Baltimore 
Norfolk 
Charleston 
Savannah 
Jacksonville 
council, 1976). Beyond this ancillary excess, however, a port may exhibit 
wasteful overcapacity in container facilities. 
Many of the ports in the United States operate within a competitive 
structure, whereby individual ports are granted a charter from each state to 
operate and manage commerce upon its public coastal lands. Most ports, 
including all of those in this study, are managed by state-run port 
authorities.These entities operate autonomously from each other and with 
minimal federal control. Therefore, each port competes separately for 
container cargo. 
As in any competitive free market system, ports attempt to gain certain 
advantages over their competitors. Accordingly, ports attempt to offer 
efficient, quality service that will expedite the loading and unloading of 
vessels. 
Container cargo is usually comprised of general cargo or manufactured 
goods. The value of container cargo is high relative to other types of cargo (i.e. 
bulk) and is charged a higher price per ton for wharfage (cargo handling) and 
demurrage (removal form the port) relative to other cargo types (Figure 2). 
Ports generate more revenue~ when they can increase the amount of 
containerized cargo moving through their facilities (throughput). They 
attempt to attract more containerized cargo by improving and expanding port 
facilities. 
Problems arise when a competing port provides at least as much 
container handling capability as its neighboring ports in order to maintain its 
cargo share and to secure a competitive position. The competition among 
ports is intense because their infrastructure (berths and storage yards) and 
superstructure (cargo handling equipment) do not vary significantly. 
Competition among ports is achieved by increasing the capacity o~ facilities to 
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FIGURE2 
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permit better service. If an individual port has sufficient facility space to 
nnmediately allocate a berth and service a vessel quickly, that port may have 
an advantage over its competitors. Ports always strive to be in this position by 
providing sufficient and even excess capacity for peak trade periods. 
Thus, like other competitive industries, ports will always exhibit a 
certain degree of over-supply. Given the unique competitive character of 
ports in the U.S. and their tendency to overbuild, how much overcapacity 
exists today in the Mid-Atlantic port range from Baltimore, Maryland to 
Jacksonville, Florida? Does this overcapacity represent significant land use, 
economic and planning inefficiencies? What policy decisions could be 
implemented to solve these problems? 
As a result of poor port planning, container facility overcapacity can 
lead to three resulting problems: 1) inefficient use of coastal lands, 2) 
inefficient use of port and public expenditures, and 3) long-term 
environmental degradation of adjacent marine resources. Inherently, 
overcapacity represents a "suboptimal allocation of resources due to over-
investment" (Hikkila, in Hershman, 1990, p. 52). Planning for port expansion 
becomes a function of monitoring growth, land availability and, most 
importantly, market conditions. Ports may find it less costly to acquire and 
develop new container facilities rather than upgrade existing facilities. 
Expanding land holdings may be less costly than improving operating 
efficiency within existing facilities due to spatial constraints. Expansion 
planning in tum adds to the tendency of ports to overbuild without 
improving operating and land use efficiencies. Port expansion precludes the 
use of coastal lands for other means and imposes future coastal planning 
constraints as available land diminishes. Inefficient capacity monitoring not 
only results in inefficient land use by ports, but may also cause long-term 
5 
environmental degradation from dredging. Further, over-investment of 
public funds is a result of planning decisions too often made without political 
review. 
According to the United States Maritime Administration, "Some of the 
port capacity being built today stems from the strong desire to entice carriers 
to divert cargo from another competing port rather then to serve incremental 
growth in cargo" (Pisani, 1990, p.37). Port managers argue that freedom to 
make decisions apart from political review is essential to the proper 
management of "these business-like enterprises" Uournal of Commerce, 
Friday June 3, 1990, p. 9c). This argument has merit, supporting the 
preservation of port competition without political interference. If 
overcapacity is shown to be extensive within the study range, however, the 
policy relating to the degree of political autonomy should be r~valuated. 
Should ports be allowed to plan for expansion apart from political 
review? On the state level, ports have been given the authority to do so. Port 
charters require only that they operate within the margins of improving local 
economies and increasing cargo throughput. Apart from the permitting 
process, development is usua,lly not questioned. Ports are public agencies. Is 
port autonomy consistent with the requirements of public accountability? 
Because the port system is competitive, expertise is required for effective port 
management. And, minimum political control is required if the port is to 
compete freely. Still, to what extent should ports continue to expand as the 
local benefits of incremental expansion decrease while additional stress is 
placed on com~unity infrastructure, and coastal land continues to be used 
up? Any accountable public agency should eliminate its redundant facilities 
just as any accountable public agency should stress _economic efficiency and 
conservation of land (Hershman, 1978, p. 81). 
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Hypothesis 
It is hypothesized that there is significant overcapacity of container 
facilities among the Mid-Atlantic range that includes the ports of Baltimore, 
Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah and Jacksonville. Competition among these 
individual ports has resulted in a tendency to overbuild in order to attract 
more cargo and revenue (Welch, 1991). This thesis assumes that if 
overcapacity exists, there may be a need for local and/ or regional capacity 
review by port managers and public officials as part of development planning 
and permitting. It is further assumed that although other options may exist, 
capacity review could lead to a more efficient port system. 
The ports included within this analysis are all large commercial 
facilities which utilize large amounts of coastal land. Container facilities 
require significant parcels of land to operate. In addition, containerization is 
increasing, and is providing the incentive for ports to expand container 
facilities. The ports studied have significant land requirements, significant 
development expenditures, and continue to grow as a result of open 
competition. For these reasons, it is suspected that the ports in this study 
exhibit significant overcapacity. 
A major issue of this study is whether or not competition leads to 
overcapacity. It is assumed, because of the historical development and the 
physical size of the U.S. port system, that a competitive port system is more 
economically efficient than a federally controlled system. Still, some type of 
capacity review on a regional level may be necessary in order to encourage 
economic and land use efficiencies while not impeding port growth. 
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A secondary hypothesis, which promotes the need for capacity review, 
is that port development will continue to exceed container throughput in the 
region. Forecasts of future container flows do not justify the extent of 
container development in ports today. Thus, the problem is not short-term. 
Rather, it is becoming greater as ports continue to develop container facilities. 
"We do not have gross overcapacity now, but with today's trend, we're 
heading down that road "(Kelly, 1987, p. 37). In support of this growing 
problem of excess container capacity, it is further hypothesized that ports are 
placing unwarranted importance on container cargo relative to other cargo 
types. 
Justification of Study 
Preliminary research shows that the ports of Baltimore, Norfolk, 
Charleston, Savannah and Jacksonville collectively operate a total of seven 
major container facilities with twenty-eight container berths and forty-seven, 
40-to 50-ton container cranes. They also utilize approximately 2,000 acres of 
coastal land for storage. Table 1 shows the facility specifications in the ports 
studied. 
According to published capacity information, a normally operating 
container berth with SO acres of backup space has an approximate capacity of 
100,000 twenty-foot containers or Twenty-foot Equivalent Units per 
year(TEUs)(Ashar,1986). A conservative preliminary calculation shows that 
with 29 berths, total capacity within the study region in 1989 equaled 2,900,000 
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TABLEl 
FACILITY SPECIFICATIONS 
PORT BERTII CRANE STORAGE CAPACITY 
PORT OF BALTIMORE 
Dundalk Marine Terminal 6 10 285 ACRFS 8,lOOTEU 
PORT HAMPTON RHODES 
Norfolk Inter. Terminal 4 7 479 ACRFS 35,528 TEU 
PORT OF CHARESTON 
North Charleston Terminal 3 5 192ACRFS 4,333TEU 
Wando Terminal 3 6 lSOACRFS 4,000TEU 
PORT OF SA VANNAH 
CONTAINERPORT 5 9 245 ACRFS 21,856 TEU 
PORT OF JACKSONVILLE 
Blount Island Terminal 3 7 180 ACRFS NIA 
Talleyrand Terminal 5 4 48ACRES NIA 
Source: Courtesy of the Ports of Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah 
and Jacksonville. 
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TEUs while actual cargo equaled only 1,935,198 TEUs. This comparison 
indicates a 49 percent current excess capacity throughout the range (Figure 3). 
Although these figures are based on rough estimates, they support a 
plausible theory that increased competition among ports for containerized 
cargo has led to overcapacity (Pisani,1989; and Kelly,1987). Furthermore, 
preliminary research also indicates that all ports in the study have either 
completed or are currently planning expansion projects today in order to 
further increase container handling capacity (See Table 2). 
In recognition of related problems in port planning, coastal land use, 
and environmental degradation, significant overcapacity becomes an even 
more pressing issue that must be faced. In this study, if significant 
overcapacity is shown to exist, a re-evaluation of policy and management on 
a regional or local level is suggested. Therefore, a more definitive 
quantification of capacity information is required. This quantification will 
ultimately help resolve policy questions associated with the problem of 
overcapacity. The purpose of this research project is: 1) to identify the 
potential problems and implications of coastal land use; 2) to quantify the 
extent of overcapacity; 3) and, to suggest policy solutions which might address 
some of these inefficiencies. 
Overcapacity of Port Container Facilities 
There are many problems related to the definition of excess port 
capacity. One is perspective. No concrete definition of excess overcapacity 
exists nor is there a definition of what constitutes a desirable level of 
overcapacity. Generally, excess capacity is that which exceeds the 
requirements for peak trade spill-over (i.e. seasonal cargoes) and military 
10 
FIGURE3 
PRELIMINARY REGIONAL CAPAOTY CALCULATION v. ACTUAL 
REGIONAL CONTAINER THROUGHPUT 
Preliminary Capacity 
Actual Throughput 
O.OOe+O 1.00e+6 2.00e+6 3.00e+6 
TE Us 
(e+6= Millions) 
Source: Courtesy of individual ports and author's calculations 
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TABLE2 
SUMMARY OF PORT EXPANSION PROJECTS 
f.QRT OF BALTIMORE 
Seagirt Terminal- a $250 million advanced facility. Facilities include 
three berths, seven container cranes on 262 acres of filled land. Capacity = 
150,000 TEUs annually. 
Dundalk Marine Terminal- $50 million Redevelopment Project. 
OORT OF NORFOLK 
Northern expansion of 26 acres on 11 acres of upland tidal wetlands for 
1992. (permits approved contingent upon mitigation of wetlands). 
PORT OF CHARLESTON 
Six new cranes 
PORI OF SAVANNAH 
Sixth container berth to come on line at the Ocean Terminal with 42 
additional acres of container storage and 1600 lineal feet to Containerport. 
PORT OF JACKSQN\TILLE 
Acquisition of three new cranes. Upgrading storage and new facility for 
Sea-Land shipping services. New federal bridge under construction. 
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berthing in time of conflict. However, differing political perspectives 
complicate the determination of a desirable level of excess capacity. It is 
imparta~t to understand these different political perspectives because they 
illustrate the complexity of managing the port industry. 
Problems Defining Excess Port Capacity 
From a federal viewpoint, a certain level of overcapacity is desirable. 
Historically, federal port policy has been linked to transportation and national 
defense policies (Marcus, 1976). There is a strong federal interest in 
minimizing transportation costs to shippers as well as providing an excess in 
capacity to serve national defense interests in times of war. However, federal 
interests also include overall social welfare functions such as land availability 
and environmental degradation. This interest is directed at broad national 
benefits. 
The state perspective and that of the individual ports is quite different. 
Ports are interested in sufficient excess capacity to ensure effective operations 
and to allow for peak trade periods. Excess capacity is a desirable condition 
which allows a port to remain competitive. State-run and locally run port 
interests are rarely concerned with overall .social benefit. Rather, a port is 
primarily concerned with the success of its operation and the opportunity to 
increase cargo throughput and revenues. 
Public concerns, involving available coastal space, public expenditure 
and the environment, influence the perception that any excess is too much. 
Public concerns for environmental protection and preservation often conflict 
with port desires to expand and up-grade facilities. It should be understood 
that determining the amount of acceptable excess capacity depends upon a 
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particular policy setting. Because the level at which excess capacity is reached 
depends upon a combination of the previously stated three perspectives, 
management for the prevention of excess capacity should naturally involve 
these factors. Ideally, there should be a coordination of port operations 
management and social welfare policy. Unfortunately, the present system of 
port development leaves decisions about acceptable excess capacity to 
individual ports. Consequently, port overcapacity extends across various port 
ranges. The question remains: how much excess should be tolerated by the 
public when it causes inefficiencies in public expenditure and coastal land 
use? 
Public Port Entities Managed as Private Corporations 
To what extent are publicly owned port facilities accountable to the 
public? The influence that this accountability should bear on the 
management of port operations is the central question of this thesis. 
Most ports in the United States, with the exclusion of military ports, 
are publicly owned. The most common form of public port management is 
the port authority. Public port authorities are created by statute as non-profit 
organizations with a separate legal personality, the right to hold property, 
make contracts, adopt budgets, employ its own personnel and function with 
considerable financial and political autonomy. The Port of New York 
Authority is described as: 
" ... a public corporation set up outside the regular framework of 
federal, state, or local government, and freed from the 
procedures or restrictions of routine government operations, in 
14 
order that it may bring the best techniques of private 
management to the operation of a self supporting or revenue 
producing public enterprise." {The New Jersey Council for Social 
Studies, 1953,p.45) 
Port authorities can vary in geographic scope from city to entire state 
jurisdictions. Their actions may conflict with broader public goals regarding 
environmental protection and coastal management. 
The following discussion pertains to publicly owned and operated ports 
and makes no distinction about the jurisdictional scope of the port. Instead, 
an argument is made that these publicly owned ports have an inherent 
prevailing public interest. Accordingly, there should be some public 
accountability for their actions. 
Efficiency: The Conflict Between Business Decisions and Public Interests. 
Efficiency in production for a private firm can be much different than 
efficiency from a social perspective. Private firms, unless they are regulated to 
do so, do not normally include social costs such as pollution as costs of 
production. Efficiency on a private level 'understates costs and overstates net-
benefits. The result is a dichotomy between public interest and business 
operations which affect public lands. 
A general criterion for optimal efficiency occurs when the marginal 
benefits of production equal marginal costs of production. For a private firm, 
this condition will be the optimal efficiency point in so far as its individual 
goals are concerned. For society, the benefits and costs become broader than 
those of the micro-environment of the firm. Society incurs external costs as a 
15 
result of private operations. In the case of ports these external costs include 
the opportunity cost of land and environmental degradation. These social 
costs may not be considered by the public port , since it can acquire land more 
easily than competing users and it does not pay taxes. Rather, these unpaid 
costs are forced upon society. Thus, the point at which the marginal benefits 
and marginal costs intersect to indicate optimal efficiency differs between the 
public and private sectors. A set of cost and benefit curves for the private firm 
understates costs because social externalities are not considered (See Figure 4). 
Quantity ~ and pa• represent an optimal output and price for port 
development when external social costs are not included. When social costs 
are considered, marginal costs of development will increase and quantity Q-
is then the optimal quantity at a higher price pt ... In reality, if a port system 
develops at~ and does not consider external social costs, then there is an 
excess quantity of port facilities of Q-- ~. 
While a private firm can have optimal production efficiency, if this 
production results in negative external costs to society, a socially inefficient 
condition exists. Since the private sector does not account for the social 
expenses, their costs are understated from a social perspective. 
As quasi-public agencies in a competitive system, ports operate 
similarly to the private firm described above. H ports are not accountable for 
social costs, they will operate under a different efficiency condition which is at 
variance with social efficiency. Inherently, over-investment and subsequent 
overcapacity in container facilities is due in large part to the fact that public 
ports operate autonomously as private corporations. Insufficient cost 
information leads to over-investment and to inefficiency in port 
development and operations. It is in recognition of the social inefficiency 
associated with quasi-public ports that information on port capacity should be 
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FIGURE4 
THEORETICAL OPTIMAL LEVELS OF PRICE AND QUANTITY FOR PORT 
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made available for coastal planning and management. Ports can then move 
towards a more socially efficient operating condition. 
A public port is often viewed by its community as an important utility 
(Marcus, 1976). It serves as a focal point for business in the city and has a 
strong economic and social impact on its community. 
While the port industry operates within a competitive market oriented 
system, it is also a public entity and, as such, is subject to public accountability. 
Public financing often provides for port expansion and improvements to 
infrastructure. At the same time, the public is concerned about the impacts of 
the port facility on surrounding communities. While these impacts may be 
beneficial, such as the economic expansion within a port region, it may also 
have negative consequences such as those mentioned with respect to 
overcapacity. 
A prominent characteristic of a public utility is that it operates at its 
greatest efficiency as a monopoly. The reason is that economies of scale result 
in decreasing unit costs with respect to increased output. The capital 
intensive nature of the present port industry mandates that the more traffic 
moving through a port, the lower the cost per ton. From a national or 
regional standpoint, duplication of facilities that serve essentially the same 
region reduces their economic efficiency. This is particularly evident in 
harbors with competing ports, such as the Ports of Long Beach and Los 
Angeles, and states such as California and Washington which have more 
than one port competing for cargo within state boundaries. The larger a port 
is, the greater are the advantages that it can realize through economies of 
scale. Economies of scale are achieved within the port through greater 
efficiencies and lower costs per ton of throughput. 
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However, large ports are particularly susceptible to public scrutiny. 
ports within the same state or harbor that compete against one another 
reduce their economies of scale and result in inefficient government 
expenditures and in higher per unit costs. Other costs to the public include 
the opportunity costs of the land utilized in the construction of unnecessary 
facilities. It also results in the public employment of duplicate personnel and 
operational services that could be more productive if employed elsewhere. 
These all represent inefficient use of public funds. 
From a national and regional standpoint, this higher than needed per 
unit cost is undesirable because it is passed on to the shipper resulting in 
elevated shipping costs. In the end, some potential cargo may not flow 
through the U.S. port system. The federal government also has an interest in 
the economic vitality of the port industry because the nation benefits from 
port economic activity (Brinson, 1980). 
There is an additional layer of complexity which surrounds the issue of 
managing public port entities as private corporations. State governments, 
local communities, and port authorities are concerned with the economic 
vitality of their ports within the industry. This has led to the present 
competitive system. At the same time, there is a public interest with respect 
to efficient coastal management and environmental protection. In other 
words, there is a conflict between economic motivations and environmental 
concerns. Yet, at the present time, there is no one to coordinate these actions. 
The environmental permitting process, although it impacts national and 
regional economic activity, does not review industry requirements for 
capacity growth. There is a desire at the federal level to ensure the protection 
and conservation of the nation's coastal zone. It is conceivable that if 
environmentally acceptable, a·port development permit application may be 
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approved even if current capacity needs are sufficient within the existing port. 
The Army Corps of Engineers, under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act 
currently accepts comments about the effects of a proposed development from 
environmental agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service. It does not, 
however, review information concerning the capacity requirements of the 
port in its Section 401, Clean Water Act permits or its Section 10, Rivers and 
Harbors Act permits. Such information is relevant and useful during permit 
review. Although there may be other relevant options to reduce the port 
overcapacity situation, the scope of this thesis relies on existing federal 
legislation and the mechanisms they provide (the ability to comment) that 
address overcapacity. Without capacity information, permitting agencies are 
not making thorough reviews of permit applications. This inefficiency in 
permit review shows the government inability to prevent unnecessary 
development on coastal lands. 
The loss of coastal ocean space from the construction of unnecessary 
container facilities is not in the public's best interest. In addition to the loss of 
coastal ocean space, there are additional effects which affect the public in a 
negative way. While increased container handling capability may bring 
positive economic benefits to the surrounding port community, there also 
may be detrimental effects associated with this construction, such as increased 
pressure on the highway and rail infrastructure. 
There are also questions surrounding continued construction pf 
container facilities. Many ports are continuing to build facilities to service 
increased intermodalism. Intermodalism is the practice of moving cargo 
from place to place utilizing several different modes of transportation. Much 
of the capacity that some ports are building seeks to capture cargo that would 
not normally flow through the port region. While the port entity and the 
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public realize a profit, the primary economic benefits of this cargo throughput 
are not felt within the port community in the same manner as cargo bound 
for the port region. Thus, some ports reach a point where the incremental 
benefits of port expansion begin to decrease. 
The question remains, should ports compete for cargo not destined for 
the port's region? Obviously, the role of a non-profit public port should not 
primarily be to earn a profit at the expense of society. If it does, it then can 
invest profit in the local society. It should function as a self-sustaining 
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economic entity much in the same way that public utilities function. It is this 
clash between free market economics and public welfare that guides the 
recommendations for managing an ever-growing overcapacity among the 
nation's container ports. 
The situation in San Pedro Bay, California illustrates the conflict. The 
recently completed 2020 plan for the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles in 
response to the projected increase in Pacific Rim trade represents an attempt 
to manage inadvertent overcapacity and inefficient use of coastal ocean space 
with respect to port growth. Coastal ocean space consists of coastal lands, near 
coastal waters and the interf~ce between the two. The plan also attempts to 
alleviate the stress placed upon transportation infrastructure as a result of 
new development. But this plan incurs specific costs that the public will bear. 
The estimated construction and implementation costs are estimated to exceed 
five billion dollars (Hall, 1990). Despite many projected benefits, there are 
many costs associated with the plan which are not easy to calculate or predict. 
The resulting environmental damage and coastal ocean space utilization 
sometimes associated.with port development should arouse public concern. 
In addition, these ports are by no means assured access to the projected 
increase in trade, and this construction may, despite planning, result in 
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overcapacity and underutilized infrastructure. From a regional perspective, 
other parts may be in a better position to handle the projected Pacific Rim 
trade and may serve ~s trade more efficiently at a reduced cost. 
While it is encouraging that these ports are at least planning on a small 
scale, regional basis, the projected increase in trade may to effect the entire 
West coast port range. Management of ct>ntainer facility capacity at this level 
can result in better efficiency in coastal ocean space utilization and improved 
economic efficiency in existing ports throughout the region. 
In order to improve the public accountability of public port actions and 
improve the management of excess overcapacity, there are many actions 
which could be taken at the federal, regional and state levels. The next 
sections explore the present roles of these governmental levels with respect to 
the management of overcapacity and suggest what roles they could play in the 
future. 
Federal Port Policy and Overcapacity of Container Facilities 
Federal policies pertaining to port development have historically been 
institutionally fragmented and short on focus. Federal port policy has been 
limited by Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution which states that: 
"No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce on 
revenue to the ports of one State over those of another: nor shall 
vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay 
duties in another." 
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This paragraph limits federal and state regulatory powers and prevents 
them from imposing either a discriminatory or competitive bias. Other 
factors have prevented the assertion of any strong federal port policy. The 
structural fragmentation and jurisdictional conflicts inherent in the 
congressional committee structure tend to constrain unified port 
development policy. 
Most federal port policy takes place at the regulatory level. Federal 
agencies affect port development in three ways: (1) through the allocation of 
federal funds for port related projects; (2) through the implementation of 
regulations that control the siting and operation of container facilities; and (3) 
through the formulation of policy that directly and indirectly affects ports. 
Much of federal regulation and policy deals with environmental 
effects. The environmental regulatory responsibilities imposed on ports are 
fragmented and split among different agencies of the federal government, 
such as the Army Corp of Engineers (COE), the Coastal Zone Management 
Program, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This 
fragmentation serves as a barrier to unified policies pertaining to the national 
port industry (Marcus, 1976). The Federal deregulation of transportation 
industries and the change in the nature of the traditional "partnership" 
pattern of port development have also prevented any strong assertion of 
federal port policy (Brinson, 1980). 
Yet, it can be argued that there is a strong need for a federal port policy. 
As the ever present effects of an intermodal transportation system take hold 
and the competitive pressures of containerization are felt by the nation's 
ports, there is a strong need to prevent excess capacity of container facilities at 
both the regional and national level. This need is expressed in the national 
desire to provide the best possible service at the lowest possible cost in order 
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to take advantage of the opportunities presented through economies of scale. 
There is also a national need to operate in a .socially efficient manner and to 
aiiJtimize the detrimental environmental effects of unnecessary expansion. 
Environmental degradation is a national concern. There is a strong national 
desire to preserve, protect and develop the marine coastal environment. 
There has already been significant federal participation in land use planning 
in the coastal zone in order to provide a balance between conservation and 
development (Holmes, 1980). 
Federal policy has shifted toward increased cost sharing between state 
and federal governments. The federal government also has a monetary 
interest in preventing overcapacity. Federal money is often spent directly or 
indirectly on projects affecting port development. These projects range from 
highway construction to channel and harbor maintenance which effect port 
operations. 
The Federal Role in Port Development 
What should be the federal role in port development with respect to 
overcapacity in container facilities? As mentioned previously, there is a 
desire at the federal level to maintain a certain level of excess capacity. Its 
importance was exhibited by the use of ports during the Gulf War in 1991. At 
the same time, there is a demand for the orderly development of an 
economically efficient transportation network of ports, railroads, and 
highways which does not impose significant social costs on the nation with 
respect to environmental degradation and inefficient use of public funds. 
The federal government can play a stronger advisory role in 
supervising port development without interfering with the competitive 
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nature of the industry. In some respects, the formulation of a comprehensive 
national port policy would be useful to guide national port development as it 
expands to meet the growing demands of intermodalism and world trade. It 
is recognized that there are many difficulties involved in the formulation of 
such a federal port policy. The integration of existing federal policies affecting 
ports is a good place to start. 
A coordinated approach within the environmental permitting and 
regulatory process with respect to port policy would be beneficial to quell the 
growing overcapacities at regional and state levels. The integration of 
regulatory responsibilities and policies towards ports would offer the federal 
government increased controls over coastal land use which results in 
overcapacity. For example, environmental impact statements prepared under 
the National Environmental Policy Act could be required to recognize 
regional forecasts of overcapacity with respect to the requirements for 
construction. The Coastal .zone Management Act could be used to facilitate 
port planning with respect to overcapacity at the State level. Within their 
permit reviews, the EPA and Army Corp of Engineers should coordinate 
efforts with other agencies in.order to ascertain required dredge and fill 
operations to help achieve desired levels of excess capacity. 
The federal government should play an ongoing role at the regional 
level with respect to assessing port container capacities. This review process 
and the required supervisory role could be handled by the Maritime 
Administration {MARAD). MARAD could coordinate environmental 
regulation of various federal and state regulatory agencies so as to minimize 
detrimental effects of overcapacity at the regional level. It could also serve as 
technical consultant and conduct the capacity review. MARAD could sponsor 
annual or semi-annual meetings for port managers, state officials, and the 
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public in an attempt to manage container overcapacity in a more efficient 
snanner. 
Federal Jurisdiction and the Regulation of Port Land Use 
Federal jurisdiction in port land use is limited to dredge and fill 
permitting through the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and section 401 of the 
Clean Water Act, 1972. This permitting process serves to protect the national 
interests of navigation, water pollution and wetlands destruction. Federal 
authority over port facility expansion does not exceed these national 
concerns. In other words, the federal government is not directly concerned 
with efficient use of coastal lands, only that land use does not impede 
navigation or result in unnecessary destruction to the environment. 
Although port policy in the U.S. has favored state control, there are a 
few federal mechanisms under the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency which control port 
development. To protect national interests in environmental protection and 
navigation, proper permit approval is mandatory for any development in 
U.S. waters or adjacent wetlands (Kalo, 1990). 
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 established Army Corps 
jurisdiction by requiring Corps approval of any construction in waters of the 
United States. According to Sec 10: 
'The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by 
Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the 
United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build any 
wharf [or] pier in any port [unless] authorized by the Secretary of the 
Army"{Kalo, 1990, p. 172). 
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The Rivers and Harbors Act created federal jurisdiction over navigation in 
vs. waters and required ports to apply for any development in these waters. 
Since 1899, there has been considerable debate as to what constitutes waters of 
the U.S. and what development may be regulated by the federal government 
through the Rivers and Harbors Act. Generally, port development has 
always required federal approval due to its navigational implications. As a 
result of increasing environmental concerns during the 1970s, the Army 
Corp's jurisdiction over coastal development was extended. 
The Clean Water Act went into effect in 1972. Section 401 of the Act 
mandated a separate permit for dredge and fill activities. The court in Zabel 
v. Tabb recognized the damaging effects of dredge and fill on coastal 
ecosystems and ruled that the Army Corps, in consultation with other 
relevant agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service, could reject a Section 
401 permit based upon environmental considerations (Kalo,1990). While the 
Clean Water Act is primarily administered by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, Sec. 401 is administered by the Army Corps of Engineers. The sec.401 
dredge and fill permit, in effect, serves as a federal check against state and 
local port development which may damage the the environment. The 
permit review considers dredged spoil site disposal, overall environmental 
impacts, practical alternatives and any proposed mitigation. 
Mitigation is. one way to address natural resource damage. Proper 
compensation is determined during the review process and is a function of 
the type and extent of damage [as well as to the extent practical]. Ports offering 
some type of mitigation effort may be favored in permit review. For example, 
the Port of Norfolk is mitigating the loss of 11 acres of wetlands as a result of 
its northern expansion by artificially creating wetlands. With the no net-loss 
national policy concerning wetlands, mitigation has become a means by 
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which parts can carry out development on sensitive wetlands. Wetlands 
creation may help in mitigating the environmental effects of port 
development, but it can often be costly and uncertain. Often, mitigation [the 
attempt to obtain a favorable modification of damages to wetlands] is 
unsuccessful and costly. Development could be completed while the 
mitigation effort fails, and the effects of completed development cannot be 
reversed. A failed mitigation effort in such a case represents a cost to the 
environment. It is in the best interest of ports and society to justify the costs 
of development by first proving that expansion is necessary. 
According to Environmental Protection Agency 1989 regulations: 
"no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there 
is a practical alternative to the proposed discharge which would 
have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the 
alternative does not have other significant adverse environmental 
consequences"(Kalo, 1990, p. 275). 
According to the definition of practical alternative, "an alternative is practical 
if it is available and, capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, 
existing technology and logistics in light of overall project purposes."(Kalo, 
1990, p. 275) 
Unless actual port technology and logistics are considered during 
permit review, proper consideration of potential practical alternatives to 
development will not occur. EPA regulations obligate federal regulators at 
EPA and the Army Corps to consider all relevant information, which could 
include figures that demonstrate productivity and the capacity requirements 
of the port. Again, MARAD could lend expert assistance, and provide 
technology and logistic information in this capacity. The following flow 
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chart is an example of how the permitting structure for port development 
could be facilitated (Figure 5). 
The federal permitting process plays a key role in a port's ability to 
expand. Economic implications to a port community from a permit denial 
based solely upon environmental considerations could be significant. The 
U.S. Supreme Court recently began to recognize that a property owner could 
not be denied economic use of his land (Kalo, 1990). The Court implied that 
economic considerations should be included in permit review for 
development on, or adjacent to wetlands. For private land owners, it may be 
fair to consider the economic viability of land use. In Sears v. Berle the Court 
was limited to determining the intended economic use of the land and not 
the viable alternatives of private land use (Kalo,1990). On public port lands, 
however, economic alternatives could be included in a permit review to 
satisfy public accountability. Federal statute and precedent mandate that 
economic considerations and viable alternatives should be considered during 
a permit review. In essence, federal law suggests the use of tools such as 
capacity review, which considers both viable alternatives to development and 
indirect economic implications. 
The analysis presented in this thesis is an example of the type of review 
which would be helpful in determining whether a practical alternative exists. 
For example, if capacity analysis indicates that a port has significant excess 
capacity, in certain instances, the alternative to not expand may be considered 
practical. 
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State/Regional Policies and the Management of Overcapacity 
State port policy in the U.S. is administered by individual state port 
authorities. The policy directives outlined in most port charters focus upon 
increasing cargo throughput and improving local economies. Any policy 
relating to land conservation may exist in a port charter or as an inherent 
factor of public accountability. The assurances of any such policy ,however, 
can not be guaranteed due to the lack of a reliable political mechanism. 
Generally, port development goes unchallenged by the public due to 
assumptions that all port development is required to maintain competitive 
positions. 
Regionally, states are not required by federal law to cooperate or engage 
in joint management. In a competitive system, it is unclear whether regional 
management, involving more than one state, is mutually beneficial. Each 
state gains economic benefits from trade revenue. In theory, inter-state 
competition distributes this wealth efficiently. Consequently, port 
competition presents barriers to a cooperative management structure. 
Efficient inter-state port management would result in cargo allocations. In 
the case of containerized cargo, regional management would also require that 
all ports agree on cargo allocation decisions. The problem with this 
proposition is that each state port has different goals, mainly involving gain 
at the expense of others. Potentially, a port can attract all the cargo in a region 
if it is big enough. The main question here is why sacrifice any cargo, when 
you could have it all? Although the existing competitive system may 
provide economic justification for state rather than regional or federal port 
management based on market theory, it does not provide for the efficient 
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allocation of coastal land. For this reason, capacity review on a state and 
regional level is necessary. 
But, there are barriers to successful state and regional management 
strUctures. Regional management cannot occur effectively unless ports have 
the same goals. Until ports can be convinced that regional management will 
result in benefits to all involved, cooperative management will not occur on 
a voluntary basis. There have been examples of this cooperation, but they 
have fallen short of achieving better land use efficiencies from a public 
perspective (Hershman, et al., 1978). In response to the charges of 
overcapacity in the 1970s, and due to the increasing difficulty in financing 
container facility development, voluntary cooperative management has 
taken place in the state of Washington (Hershman,et al., 1978). The 
Cooperative Development Committee (CDC) of The Washington Public Ports 
Association (WPPA) was formed to review port projects. Although it 
functioned particularly well in sharing capacity information among ports, 
capacity information was utilized by non-member ports and there were no 
sanctions for non-compliance (Hershman, et al, 1978). CDC in Washington 
was an attempt at preventing .redundant facilities and improving efficiency; 
however, the Association did not coordinate planning efforts with other 
public officials and thus precluded any effective regional management 
(Hershman, et al., 1978). 
Regional or coordinated state management must consider port needs 
in conjunction with other social welfare functions, such as other uses of 
public land. Clearly, it would be useful to involve port managers, regulatory 
officials, and the public in government in the decision-making process. 
Whether or not such management should be mandated depends upon the 
extent of the overcapacity problem. It is suggested that the competitive port 
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Ystem in the U.S. is the best system available and should remain intact. To s . 
prevent potentially wasteful use of public coastal space, however, policy must 
be reevaluated and designed to meet the social goals of land conservation. 
Understandably, ports are not primarily concerned with land 
conservation. As a public agency competing for international trade, the port 
is ultimately concerned with sustaining its viability and competitive success. 
Permit review is left to other state agencies. These agencies do not base their 
decisions upon a port's productivity and capacity information. While 
assuming that a port requires expansion, factors such as land conservation 
and environmental concerns form the basis of local governmental decision-
making. Perhaps this check is sufficient. However, a better decision-making 
process involving cooperation between port management and other public 
officials could occur if local government and other state agencies involved in 
land use development were provided with capacity information. Port activity 
and coastal land use go hand in hand. Port and coastal space management 
should therefore be coordinated. Not only will the port benefit from accurate 
productivity and capacity assessment, but inter-agency review of this 
information can facilitate decisions concerning coastal space utilization. 
An important point to be made is that regardless of accurate 
productivity and capacity monitoring, overcapacity may still occur. Port 
expansion and improvement requires many years of planning and 
development. Ports are forced to develop according to anticipated cargo 
rather than proven growth. Thus, there is bound to be a certain amount of 
excess capacity. The goal of public policy should be to decide how much excess 
is allowed. This determination can only occur with a cooperative effort 
between public ports and other public officials once all pertinent port 
information is made available for study. A thorough inter-agency capacity 
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review will lend itself to maximum attainable social planning efficiency 
within the competitive framework. Thus, close cooperation provides a 
111echanism for limiting overcapacity on a local and regional level. 
Summary 
Inter-port competition in the U.S. has resulted in an expansive port 
system and the development of large container facilities. Within a region, 
duplicate facilities create overcapacity. This overcapacity represents social 
inefficiencies in coastal land utilization, public expenditures, and 
environmental degradation. As container development continues, 
expansion by politically autonomous public ports threatens to increase these 
inefficiencies. A certain level of autonomy must be preserved so that ports 
can operate effectively in a competitive world economy. As public entities, 
ports are accountable for their actions. In order to prevent the social 
inefficiencies created by excess capacity, a policy designed to link port 
management with the environmental regulatory system is needed. 
A capacity review should become part of a coordinated state or regional 
planning effort as a means to allow for more efficient coastal space utilization. 
Such a review is good public policy. Perhaps it is time to draw the line with 
respect to total port autonomy. Port activities can concurrently increase 
economic benefits to a region while incurring heavy social costs . With better 
planning that attempts to strike a balance between development and 
conservation, the future will bring more efficient use of the nation's 
dwindling coastal ocean space and maximize the benefits of its use to society 
as a whole. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONTAINERIZATION AND PORT DEVELOPMENT 
During the 1950s, containers were introduced in the shipping industry. 
Subsequently, a technological revolution began which has pervaded all areas 
of the transportation and trade industry. Unitization of cargo has provided 
for faster handling of cargo at ports. The container unit can be loaded directly 
onto truck chassis or rail cars for greater transport efficiency. Reduced 
pilferage and cargo damage are other advantages of containerization. Since 
its introduction in the 1950s, container cargo has grown to approximately 70 
million TEUs per year worldwide (Containerization International Yearbook, 
1989). This growth has led to the development of many container facilities 
throughout the U.S. Ports are continually developing these facilities in an 
effort to increase cargo handling and revenue generating potential (Dowd and 
Leschine, 1990). The competitive U.S. market structure has resulted in excess 
capacity as _ports continue to _expand their container handling capabilities 
(Kelly, 1987). Competition can normally be viewed as being beneficial to both 
consumers and producers. However, because the U.S. port system does not 
operate under pure laissez-faire economic principles, competition may lead to 
over-supply of facilities, and to excess capacity. 
Containerization 
Containerization refers to the packing of general cargo into twenty-foot 
metal containers (TEUs) or forty-foot containers (FEUs). This unitization was 
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first utilized on a wide scale in the 1950s. Containerization initiated a 
revolution in shipping technology as it facilitated cargo movement between 
parts and improved shipping efficiency. Because containers can be directly 
loaded onto truck beds and trains from ships, pilferage of cargo as well as 
cargo loss were reduced. Quicker off-loading and loading brought about by 
containerization attracted ports and shippers alike to adapt to the new 
technology· 
Today, containerization of general cargo which formally moved as 
break-bulk cargo, such as coffee, is the rule rather than the exception. 
Containerization has grown steadily since the Fifties while contributing to 
improved shipping and port technologies. Shippers and carriers now operate 
vessels that can hold nearly 5,000 containers per voyage. The economies of 
scale created by these vessels increase operating efficiency. Barge-carrying 
vessels such as LASH (lighter aboard ship) and Sea Bee vessels, can load and 
unload b~rges full of containers. Rather than transferring cargo from large 
vessels to small vessels or to feeder barges, barge-carrying vessels can unload 
the barge itself. Barge-carrying vessels save tr~ns-shipment costs in transit as 
well as expensive port fees. In response to the growth of containerization, 
port technologies have advanced accordingly so as to accommodate the 
demand by port users for container handling facilities. 
Specially designed container cranes are required to handle container 
cargo within a port. They are capable of handling 35 to 40 containers per hour 
(Containerization International, 1987). Newer technology now provides 
cranes that can handle 50 boxes per hour (Container News, 1988). Ideally, 
once a box is off-loaded from a vessel, it can be placed directly on a truck 
chassis or rail car to continue on its trans-shipment route. Due to moderate 
time and logistic inefficiencies, however, much of a vessel's cargo is placed in 
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1 container yard short time storage until it is claimed, checked through 
customs and shipped to its final destination. Also, storage space is required 
for cargo that is to be loaded onto a vessel for water transport. Due to large 
capacity container vessels and transshipment lag times, some 30 to 50 acres of 
back storage is required per container berth (National Research Council, 1976). 
In addition to this large amount of land, 800 to 1,000 foot berths with channel 
depths of 35 to 40 feet are required to accommodate the container ships of 
today (Pisani, 1989). 
Variable yard operating systems are utilized by ports which result in 
variable land use efficiencies per acre. There are four basic types of 
operations: chassis, straddle carrier, yard gantry and top loader. 
I 
In the chassis system, containers are stored on truck chassis. This 
operation allows trucks to quickly attach to a chassis and quickly remove 
containers from a port. Typical land use efficiencies associated with the 
. chassis system are 70 TEUs per acre (Boschken, 1988). A chassis based yard 
storage system can not handle as many containers per acre as a stacking 
system. It may seem, then, that the chassis system is not as efficient as a 
stacking system. But, the s~d of cargo transfer in a chassis yard from ship to 
shore, port to destination and vise versa makes this system equally efficient 
over time per acre as other systems of container storage. 
Straddle carriers transport containers from the apron to the yard and 
from the yard to truck or rail. The typical efficiency associated with straddle 
carrier systems is 168 TEUs per acre (Boschken, 1988). 
Yard gantry systems allow the most land use efficiency at 325 TEUs per 
acre (Boschken, 1988). Yard gantries allow for higher stacking and thus for 
more containers per area. Similarly, top loader systems have land use 
efficiencies of 240 TEUs per acre (Boschken, 1988). 
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From a strictly land use perspective, stacked systems involving yard 
gantries, straddle carriers and top loaders are more efficient than chassis based 
operations. A Chassis system's low land use efficiency may be made up in 
yard productivity. Chassis can be moved in and out more quickly and 
therefore may be no less efficient than stacked operations in container yards. 
Thus, port overcapacity is only partially a function of container yard land use 
efficiency. A combination of factors including land use efficiency, yard 
productivity and berth productivity influence the extent of overcapacity. 
Another result of increased containerization has been the reduction of 
manual labor within ports (Gilman, 1987). Containerization is capital 
intensive as opposed to the labor intensive loading and unloading before the 
advent of container technology. This trend continues as ports focus more of 
their resources onto container facilities. 
One major characteristic of containerized cargo is its relatively higher 
value per ton compared to other break-bulk and bulk cargoes. Ports can 
charge more per ton for this cargo. They can generate more revenue by 
attracting more container cargo. Because of higher potential revenue and the 
growth of containerization throughout the industry, capital intensive 
container facility development will likely continue to replace longshoremen. 
While this development is continuing, the externalities of the container 
revolution must be addressed. In the long-run, the loss of longshoremen jobs 
may prove to be a positive externality. Increased port efficiencies result in 
increased cargo revenues and promote positive secondary employment 
impacts throughout the port community. In addition, former port labor can 
be retrained making them more productive in an economic sense, than if 
they continued to work while not utilizing the modern technology. 
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The negative impacts on coastal land use from container facility 
development is the impetus for this thesis. It is an established matter of 
practice that ports dredge and fill coastal lands and wetlands in order to 
provide adequate paved storage yards for containers, extended berths and 
deepened channels. This practice is necessary for efficient container handling. 
· While dredge and fill activity is regarded as environmentally degrading, it is 
necessary to a certain extent to accommodate increases in the size of vessels 
engaged in international trade. The competition among ports for container 
cargo tends to lead to overdevelopment as independent autonomous port 
authorities attempt to provide better services and more storage and berthing ' 
space. These trends require that more attention be directed toward the 
possible negative effects of overdevelopment within United States port 
system. 
Container Importance 
The need for capacity review on a local or regional level is supported by 
the increasing level of importance that ports are placing on containerized 
cargo. In order to remain competitive in the shipping industry, U.S. ports 
have to accommodate the growing amount of containerized cargo being 
shipped on the oceans, Great Lakes, rivers and waterways. Between 1985 and 
1989, container tonnage increased from about 12 million shc:>rt tons to over 20 
million tons among the ports being studied (See Table 3) (AAPA,1991). 
Container cargo increases represent the commitment of more land and 
financial resources by ports toward container facility development. The 
increased use of port resources does not present a problem to society. But, in a 
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TABLE3 
NUMBER OF CONTAINERS (TEUs) 
Port 1985 1990 %change 
Baltimore 709489 569000 -19.80 
Hampton Roads 299532 685295 128.79 
Charleston 431040 795385 84.53 
Savannah 368773 376295 2.()4 
Jacksonville 80621 126319 56.68 
Avenge Change S0.45% 
Source: Courtesy of the American Association of Port Authorities 
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palicy setting, when ports exhibit overcapacity, problems associated with 
those previously mentioned are likely to continue into the future. 
The importance of containerized cargo to a large port is not in doubt. 
Containerization has become the preferred means of transporting 
manufactured goods and more effort is being put into this area of shipping 
than any other. Nevertheless, the growing emphasis of ports with regard to 
containerization has several implications which concern this study. 
It has been discussed in this chapter that container facility development 
requires a large amount of dredge and fill activity which can be detrimental to 
coastal ecosystems. In addition, these facilities require large capital 
investments. If the analysis in this study shows that there is sufficient 
existing container capacity at ports to handle cWTent and future cargo 
demands, additional development on a large scale will be wasteful. Further, 
the following results indicate that the problems associated with overcapacity 
are not going away. Instead, they are intensifying. 
Location Quotient 
Location quotients have been used to illustrate the relative degree of 
importance that ports in this study are placing on container cargo. Originally 
used to measure the movement of populations in geographical locations, this 
method was used by Kula and Marti in a prior port study (Marti, 1982, and 
Kula 1986). The following formula yields a ratio which represents the 
importance of container cargo to an individual port compared to the entire 
region. Cargo tonnage figures obtained from the American Association of 
Port Authorities are utilized in the current study. The formula can be 
expressed as: 
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.B,elative iroporta~~ (~c/xt)/(YC/YT). 
Where: . xc= individual port container cargo 
xt= individual port total cargo 
YC= total regional port container cargo 
YT= total regional port total cargo 
A ratio less than 1.00 indicates that containerization at an individual port is 
less important in comparison to containerization within the region on the 
whole. A ratio greater than 1.00 indicates that containerization at an 
individual port is more important than it is to the region. The results 
demonstrated in Table 4 and the accompanying Figure 6 show that all of the 
ports except Baltimore and Savannah have placed increasing importance on 
containerized cargo since 1985. 
Competition Among Container Facilities 
All five state-run ports that were studied operate in competition with 
each other. Through the marketing of various services offered by each port to 
its port users, competing ports continuously attempt to increase cargo tonnage 
(throughput) and revenues. By providing the_ most advanced container 
handling technology in addition to expanding cargo storage capability, ports 
are more likely to achieve their major goals. As they succeed, competing 
ports attempt to "out-do" each other by focusing their resources on expanding 
facilities and deepening channels and berths to accommodate new 
generations of container vessels, by providing more high technology 
container cranes and storage yard equipment. Similar to other competitive 
industries, ports exhibit a certain degree of over supply. The possibility that 
over supply of container facilities represents a waste of public funds and 
coastal-land leads to the present analysis. 
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TABLE4 
CONTAINER TONNAGE V. TOTAL CARGO IN SHORT TONS 
1985 1989 
container Total container Total 
Baltimore 5088270.0 260%000 4262306.4 31025000 
Charleston 3085677.1 6792000 6181668.9 9094000 
Jacksonville 844515.1 4248000 1927901.8 5489000 
Hampton 346515.4 57074000 5387093.8 6.3976000 
Savannah 3281709.2 9224000 3034356.6 1~ 
TOTALS 12646686.8 103434000 20793327.5 119892000 
Source: Courtesy of the American Association of Port Authorities 
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Without impeding market-efficient competition between inter-state 
part authorities; the goal of this analysis is to present a method for analyzing 
regional port capacity. In this way an effort to provide better management 
within each separate port authority and to some extent in cooperation with 
all port authorities could achieve maximum operating efficiency. 
It has been argued that the level at which ports compete is declining, 
i.e. that barriers to entry are becoming greater, limiting the ability of smaller 
ports to compete (Talley, 1988). As a result of the high cost of port 
development, an argument can be made that larger ports are better able to 
fund such development while smaller ports cannot. While this may be true 
in some instances, it has not occurred in the mid-Atlantic coast range. As 
seen in market-share analysis (See Figure 7), there has not been dominant 
growth by any one port. In fact, the indication that over-supply exists 
throughout the region shows that the level of competition may indeed be 
increasing (See Table 5). 
The deregulation of the ocean transportation industry has been one of 
the causes of increasing competition among ports. In 1984, the ocean 
transportation industry in th~ United States was deregulated so that it could 
compete more freely and offer internationally competitive prices. The effect 
on ports was that land and sea shippers and carriers could pick and choose at 
which ports to call. Intermodal rail and trucking competition led to more 
variability in trans-shipment of cargo, and ports became uncertain of where, 
when, and how much cargo throughput they could expect. One way they 
could affect throughput, aside from facility leasing agreements with private 
operators, was to expand and improve container cargo facilities. Still, they 
could never be assured of stable long-term cargo throughput. Intensified 
competition among the entire transportation industry, as a result of 
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TABLES 
TEUs BY TERMINAL 
1987TEUs 1988 TEUs 1989 TEUs 1990 TEUs 
PORT OF BALTIMORE 
Dundalk Marine Terminal 474139 477093 427992 35458.5 
PORT UAMPI'ON RHODF.S 
Norfolk Inter. Terminal 173057 367006 411177 NIA 
PORT OF CHARF.STON 
North Charleston Terminal 253116 232462 261177 NIA 
Wando Terminal 197430 226792 333886 NIA 
PORT OF SAVANNAH 
CONTAINERPORT 362200 365580 372876 402818 
PORT OF JACKSONVILLE 
Blount Island and Talley. 111046 NIA 128090 154491 
Source: Courtesy of individual ports 
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deregulation, has subsequently intensified the competition among ports for 
containerized cargo. Not only are ports interested in improving local benefits 
trom their activities, but-as a result of intermodalism-they are concerned 
with providing connections to as broad an area as possible. 
To understand the efficiencies and inefficiencies of competition within 
the port system, a simple discussion of competition is necessary. If 
competition fosters better operating efficiency in most if not all industries, 
then ports are no different on a micro-level than other enterprises. 
Competition provides fair market prices for the port user without much 
variation among ports. Although they are governmental entities, ports 
interact with private international commercial industries. It is in their best 
interest to keep costs low, so that they can offer competitive service prices for 
dockage, wharfage, storage and drayage (removal). In this respect, ports are 
efficient and contribute to the economic well-being of the state and region 
they serve. 
Competition is regarded as offering economic efficiency within an 
industry. But, there are inefficiencies associated with competition as well. 
Port expansion is financed through large public expenditures from revenue 
bonds, reinvested port revenues, and taxes. When substantial port resources 
are invested in container facilities (superstructure and infrastructure), it is 
assumed that such investments can be justified. Infrastructure is the physical 
improvement that allows the vessel to berth at a port. Superstructure is the 
equipment that is necessary to handle and transport the cargo in the port. 
Because such facilities take many years to plan and develop, there is a level of 
uncertainty with respect to future cargo flows which will pass through the 
new facility. Due to the high level of competition among the transportation 
industry as a whole, the impetus for new port developments lies in the hope 
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for cargo attraction, rather than actual cargo growth at the port. Often then, 
new part expansion projects cannot be quantitatively justified because new 
growth in cargo throughput has not occurred. Ip these cases, underutilized 
facilities, including large unused portions of facilities beyond those necessary 
to accommodate peak trade periods, represent inefficient public expenditure 
as well as inefficient coastal land use. 
Inefficient coastal land use may not represent a problem if an 
alternative use does not exist. Much of the land which has been used for new 
container facilities, however, is a result of filled wetlands or converted coastal 
ecosystems. Loss of environmental quality as well as the value associated 
with use and non-use of the land resource represents a coastal land use 
problem worth correcting. 
In addition, public ports can often acquire coastal lands at a lower cost 
than improving operating efficiency at existing facilities. Ports often acquire 
land as part of their charters. They can also acquire tax-free land because they 
are a public agency. Ports, in effect, have an advantage over all other water-
dependant, water-related and non-water related uses. Inefficient land use by 
ports, therefore, may not affect overall efficiency if more land can be cheaply 
acquired rather than restructuring existing facilities. This acquisition will not 
contribute to higher average costs in the port. In these cases it is possible that 
acquiring more land will be more economically efficient to the port but not 
necessarily more socially efficient. 
Free competition, without regulation, will, like other competitive 
industries, improve market efficiency on a port level by providing better 
service, and fair market prices to the port user. However, while efficient for 
the industry, expanding the supply of the port service market implies social 
external costs involving the mis-use of public funds and coastal lands. 
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indeed, part competition has intensified along the East Coast, and ports there 
}lave demonstrated their continuing desire to place more importance upon 
container cargo. These increasing levels of competition along with the fact 
that parts are concentrating more resources on container handling 
capabilities, suggest that the problems associated with over-supply will 
increase into the future. In this respect, the competition associated with 
containerization and the quasi-public port has led to a sub-optimal efficiency 
condition on the social level. To correct this situation, more information on 
port growth requirements must be obtained and made available for future 
planning. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CAPA01Y ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
In order to manage any system effectively, quantitative information is 
necessary to ensure quality and efficient productivity consistently. Through 
accurate measurement of productivity and growth, a port can better manage 
its existing capacity and plan for required expansion. Capacity monitoring can 
lead to maximum efficiency in port productivity and more efficient coastal 
land utilization. As publicly owned, non-profit agencies that operate on 
public land, ports must make efficient use of coastal space to accommodate 
public interests. The allocation of coastal space for port development excludes 
others from the use of this space. Social inefficiency occurs if the benefits of 
land use do not equal or exceed the opportunity cost of the land. 
Port development results in environmental degradation associated 
with dredging and filling (Zabel v. Tabb, in Kalo, 1990). In addition, vessel 
traffic contributes to environmental degradation from air and water 
pollution. This pollution places additional stress on natural ecosystems. 
Ecosystems can be lost and disturbed by any development activity. But, some 
waterfront development is necessary in environmentally sensitive areas for 
Water-dependent and water-related uses such as ports. In the proper 
management of coastal lands, non-water dependant uses such as residential 
construction should not take precedence over water-dependent port activity. 
In accordance with proper coastal land management, development should 
not usually take place in environmentally sensitive coastal areas if it is not 
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necessary. Port activity is water-dependant and should not be denied if 
benefits are shown to exceed costs. The negative consequences associated 
with port development projects imply that port managers, in cooperation 
with public officials, should utilize planning techniques designed to limit 
part overcapacity. 
The management of coastal space is becoming increasingly important 
as the demands on coastal lands increase. Public policy which addresses 
coastal issues in an integrated fashion is required for the proper preservation 
and protection of the environment in the future. Since ports require large 
amounts of coastal space to operate effectively, it is necessary that port 
requirements be quantified through productivity monitoring and capacity 
review. In this respect, port development can be justified. If it is justified, 
port development should be incorporated into integrated mechanisms for the 
management of the environment and expenditure of public funds. 
A container capacity review can provide information to port managers 
and public authorities about the development needs of a port. Capacity 
review can also be used to indicate how much excess capacity is justified. 
Accordingly, "the more productive you are, the more capacity can be 
generated in your terminals, and the less you need to expand them." (Ashar, 
1986, p. 93). Capacity review models, both simple and complex, can be used to 
determine need for expansion and better productivity. 
Measuring Container Productivity and Capacity 
Industry pressures for improved productivity at container facilities has 
Stimulated ports to take a serious look at improving facility productivity. In 
response to this demand, there has been considerable interest in the manner 
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by which container facility productivity can be measured (Dowd and Leschine, 
t990). Accurate quantification and monitoring is necessary to assess 
production at container facilities. This measurement gives ports a better 
understanding of their capacity needs as well as their productivity strengths 
and weaknesses. Productivity analysis and monitoring also serves as a 
valuable planning tool, not only for ports, but for society. It is a means to 
achieve more efficient coastal land use. 
A container facility involves interaction of port users and port 
facilities. The level of a facility's operations efficiency depends upon the 
productivity of berths, cranes, container yards, gates and labor. Included 
below is a sample of how productivity and capacity in container facilities can 
be measured. These measurements have been outlined and suggested as a 
result of the National Research Council's 1986 Study addressing the 
improvement of productivity in U.S. container facilities (National Research 
Council, 1988). 
Productivity Factors Which Affect Container Facility Operations. 
The Container Berth represents the focal point of port productivity. 
The factors which influence berth productivity include its length, the number 
of cranes, berth occupancy, and cargo movement operations to and from the 
berth. To measure berth productivity, a manager must take into account the 
number of container vessels worked per year at a particular berth in addition 
to the length of the work shift and the number of shifts per year. This factor 
represents net-berth occupancy or utilization. 
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The Container Yard along with the berth are the two most important 
areas where investment is made. Efficient productivity management, 
therefore, must be concentrated in these two areas. The factors which 
influence yard productivity include storage acres, shape of land area, type of 
storage system (chassis or stacked), container dwell time (the time from when 
the cargo enters the yard to when it leaves), roadway design and labor 
productivity. Productivity in the yard is measured by TEUs per year per gross 
acre, and TEU capacity per net storage acre. Gross acreage includes the entire 
area, while net-acreage consists of gross acreage minus infrastructure 
improvements, such as roads, buildings and other areas which have 
constraints on storage. This measurement yields the productivity factor, yard 
throughput, and yard storage. 
The Crane characteristics, including weight capacity, single or double 
lift potential, breakdowns and vessel characteristics influence its productivity. 
Normally, cranes operate at a rate of 20-35 TEUs per hour (Containerization 
International, 1987). Double lift cranes can achieve 50 lifts per hour 
(Container News, 1988). However, varying rates are a function of operator 
skill. Operational delays and downtime also influence overall productivity. 
Crane productivity is measured by moves per hour, downtime and crane 
hours. This measurement yields net and gross productivity. 
The Gate is an important element of facility productivity. The factors 
Which affect gate productivity include operational hours, number of lanes, 
extent to which it is automated and whether a data collection system exists. 
Better productivity in the gate depends largely upon the efficiency of 
container weighing and documentation checks. Productivity of the gate is 
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JJ\easured in containers per hour, per lane, and truck turnaround time. 
These figures yield net and gross throughput factors. 
Labor is the final major element affecting facility productivity. Gang 
sizes, work rules, general skill of workers, work environment, amount of 
training and vessel characteristics all influence labor productivity. This 
productivity is measured by the number of moves per man hour. 
Mariy factors within the operating port affect capacity. From an 
operations standpoint, productivity among the various sectors in the port 
influence and determine overall productivity and available capacity. In this 
thesis, physical productivity measures of capacity are calculated, not cost 
efficiencies. According to some models, optimal capacity has been 
determined using costs and financial efficiency (Varaprasad, 1986). Due to the 
fact that the above cost methods do not include the social cost of overcapacity, 
they may not be accurate. In addition, this study examines physical 
overcapacity as a social inefficiency. Thus, it is concerned only with physical 
productivity measures. 
The following analysis attempts to demonstrate two things. First, it 
determines whether the seven container facilities studied exhibit individual 
overcapacity. It has been suggested that, ''U.S. public ports have failed to 
enhance productive usage of container facilities" (Ashar, 1986). The capacity 
analysis demonstrates whether this is true or not. Second, the analysis serves 
to demonstrate the usefulness of accurate productivity data as a tool to 
monitor port capacity at container facilities. The quantification of capacity is 
an important step toward the prevention of unnecessary port investment. In 
addition, through productivity monitoring within the port, quality control 
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can be better maintained, and improvements in these productivity measures 
can more easily be attained. 
Method 
The method that will be used to test the major hypothesis is based on a 
capacity modeling formula called The Container Capacity Model that has been 
previously utilized by the Ports and Inland Waterways Institute. It is an 
input/output model in which the input variables include productivity ratios 
for the storage yard and berth utilization. For example, data on berth 
utilization (i.e. number of vessel calls, typical number of containers per call 
and ship-shifts worked per vessel) will be divided by the total number of 
vessel shifts in a year to yield the berth requirement for a given number of 
vessels and containers. 
These variables are a function of variable shipping line characteristics 
per port, including size of vessels and frequency of calls. In addition, typical 
loading, unloading, and storage ratios are added to accurately account for 
cargo handling operations within ports. 
The Container Terminal Capacity Model was developed as a practical 
planning tool and was originally used at the Port of Seattle to assess container 
facility capacity (Ashar, 1986). In the absence of true cost figures, cargo 
movement productivities are utilized to accurately assess facility efficiencies. 
limitations of the model, however, are that the ratios used for facility 
operations assume equal operational efficiencies among facilities with regard 
to cargo movements per hour and per vessel. Although these ratios do not 
yield exact results for a particular facility, they are based upon reasonable 
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industry data and will yield reasonably accurate output information (Ashar, 
1986). 
Based upon shipping line characteristics, actual berth utilization, and 
container yard productivity data, the model permits an accurate 
measurement of container capacity at a facility. Once the capacity is 
evaluated, the amount of excess can be determined by simply comparing 
capacity with actual cargo throughput. 
Berth capacity 
Berth capacity is a function of crane productivity, and labor 
productivity per ship size and shipping line class (See Table 6). To simplify 
the model, ship sizes were categorized into three classes: 
Large Lines-call every seven days or less, exchange 1,000 or more boxes 
per call, and contribute 100,000 TEUs per year. 
Medium Lines--call every seven to ten days, exchange 600 boxes per call 
and contribute 50,000 TE'µs per year. 
Small Lines- -call 15 or more days, exchange 100-200 boxes per call and 
contribute 5 to 10,000 TEUs per year.(Ashar, 1986) 
Individual vessels may be considered in berth capacity calculation, 
unfortunately, necessary size information was not available for this study. 
Typically, container berths can move an average of 170 boxes per crane 
shift (Ashar, 1986). Of course, this number varies with the number of cranes 
per berth and the skill of the crane operator. A shift is considered to entail an 
eight hour time period. Ship size affects unloading or loading requirements. 
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TABLE6 
BERTH CAPACTIY CALCULATION 
MovHlcrane Avenge Shift 
UneType MovHlcall .tdft per call RHL &HU Avenge 
Large 1500 170 8.82 12 1.36 
Medium 600 150 4 6 15 
Small 200 120 1.67 3 1.8 
Net lhifts Berth 
per call Safety Margin Shilt~ear Requirement 
7 6 678 0.64 
4 6 521 0.49 
2 6 146 0.14 
Average Berth Requirement Per Ship Linea ."23 
Source: Ashar, 1986 
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Thus, large ships require more shifts. Subsequently, the berth requirement 
for larger vessels is greater. 
The operational factors added in the calculation of the berth 
requirement coefficient reflect productivity margins. The Reasonably High 
Level Factor (RHL) accounts for high ship loads and/or low productivity on 
the berth. The safety margin accounts for the margin of time between ship 
arrivals to assure that no ships have to wait. Finally, the berth requirement 
was obtained by dividing gross ship shifts per year by the total shifts in a year. 
Yard capacity 
A conservative assumption of 50 acres required per berth was made to 
accommodate the varying degrees of yard utilization among the ports in this 
study. This acreage is deemed sufficient to permit the effective operation all 
types of yard systems. 
Based upon accurate shipping line characteristics at the facility, and 
given yard acre requirements per berth, capacity of the port can be generated. 
Further, berth and yard requirements are indicated. The amount of excess 
capacity can be determined.by comparing these three results to actual cargo 
and physical characteristics. 
Calculations 
The calculations for the total container capacity within a given facility 
is measured in TEUs or container units. Total capacity includes empty as well 
as full containers. It should be noted that the final capacity number for a 
facility included the characteristics of shipping lines, operations on the berth 
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and in the yard, and other port operations. The individual facility analyses 
proceeded according to the numbered steps which follow. 
Average berth requirement 
The average berth requirement was calculated based upon the shipping 
characteristics outlined previously. Table 6 p.58, summarizes the berth 
requirements for each line type. Data needed to make exact calculations were 
not available from the ports, therefore, an average requirement was 
determined based upon Table 6. The average berth requirement for a model 
ship line generating an average of 52,500 TEUs annually is .423 berthing space. 
Determining the number of model ship lines per port 
To determine the berth requirement for actual cargo throughput, the 
average berth requirement for a ship line generating 52,500 TEUs must be 
multiplied by the representative number of model lines. This is not the 
actual number of lines in the port. It is, however, representative of many 
lines exhibiting similar size and cargo generation characteristics. For 
example, rather than counting_ ten ship lines, one line is used to account for 
the requirements of all ten actual lines. The following demonstrates the line 
calculation: 
Total # of TEUs per year I 52,500 TEUs = # of Model lines. 
Determining total berth requirement 
The total berth requirement is the necessary amount of berth space 
needed to accommodate existing cargo throughput and is determined by the 
following: 
#of Model Lines • .423 = Total Berth Requirement. 
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This calculation is useful to the port in order to determine whether 
sufficient berth space is available for existing cargo throughputs. As a 
planning tool, berth capacity calculations can be used to indicate whether or 
not additional berths will be required. In_ addition, if sufficient excess is 
shown using this calculation, a particular port can formulate investment 
criteria based, in part upon berth requirements. 
Determining yard requirement 
Earlier, it was stated that yard moving systems vary considerably. A 
standard yard requirement does not give justice to the effectiveness of a 
particular yard system. Because different yard systems yield different yard 
productivities, this study assumes a conservatively high yard requirement. 
Normally, 30 to 50 acres of yard storage space is needed per berth (Hershman, 
1989). For the subsequent analysis, SO acres will represent the,storage space 
required per berth. 
Highest attainable berth productivity 
A number of factors influence the productivity in berths, as mentioned 
earlier. High levels of productivity are 150,000 TEUs/berth/year (Gilman, 
1987). But, because all ports have different physical and operational 
characteristics, setting a single high industry standard for all ports is not 
practical. While berth productivity may be limited to operational barriers, 
these productivities could be improved in many instances. Although yard 
moving systems vary, much of the overall superstructure and infrastructure 
are identical among ports. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a port 
exhibiting low productivity could make changes enabling it to achieve 
productivities equal to its neighbor. The use of productivity monitoring is 
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justified under this assumption. When capacity can be improved through 
facility redevelopment unnecessary expansion can be prevented. In this 
respect, better productivities can increase cargo ~apacity without significant 
~xpansion of land. 
Cargo throughput among the ports studied have revealed that the 
Wando Terminal at the Port of Charleston yields the highest berth 
productivity at 111,295 TEUs/berth/year. Recognizing the intense 
competition among these ports, it is not unreasonable to suggest that all ports 
in the range could achieve this type of productivity figure, given size and 
facility similarities. It has been demonstrated that ports achieve better 
productivities than this (Containerization International Yearbook, 1989). 
Therefore, 111,295 TEUs/berth/year is not extraordinary. This number 
represents the highest attainable regional berth productivity and is used to 
calculate the total capacity of the existing port facility. This study indicates 
that there is sufficient excess in existing facilities to accommodate a 
substantial increase in cargo throughput. Capacity potentials were calculated 
according to the following: 
Potential throughput given productivity increase 
= # of existing berths • 111,295 TEUs 
#of model lines after productivity increase 
=Potential Throughput I 52,500 TEUs 
Berth requirement for potential cargo increase 
= # of Model lines post increase • .423 
Yard requirement for potential productivity increase 
=New Berth Requirement• SO acres 
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The requirements for potential increase represent the total capacity in 
the part. The excess capacity is simply the difference between utilized capacity 
and the total port capacity. Applied consistently throughout the range, the 
calculations represent reasonably accurate capacity assessment. The excess 
within these ports is not necessarily alarming in itself for most of the facilities 
studied. What is of concern from a social point of view is that, despite the 
excess and relatively slow cargo growth trends, these ports continue 
developing new and improved facilities. Based on these results, such 
development in many cases may not be justified; for this reason, overcapacity 
is a public concern. 
The Port of Baltimore (Dundalk Marine Terminal) 
In 1706, the Maryland General Assembly established the Port of 
Baltimore along the Patapsco River. It serves as one of the nation's busiest 
deep water ports and accommodates all types of cargo in many facilities along 
a 45 mile shoreline. 
The 570 acre Dundalk multi-use Marine Terminal is the largest facility 
in the port. Dundalk handled the largest share of container cargo throughout 
the study region in 1989 (Table 5, p. 47). With six berths and ten container 
cranes, the facility handled approximately 427,000 TEUs in 1989. Despite this 
apparent success, container throughputs since 1985 have shown a combined 
decline of about 19 percent (Table 3, p. 40). While this decline continues, 
there is increasing expenditure on facility improvements within Dundalk 
Terminal. In 1989, a $50 million redevelopment plan was approved to 
attempt improvement of facility productivity through channel dredging. The 
improvements are designed to accommodate larger vessels. 
63 
The expenditure of funds for the facility occurs at a time when the port 
has recently opened its new high technology Seagirt container facility, which 
is adjacent to Dundalk. Since Seagirt began operations in 1990, its 
throughputs are excluded from this capacity study. However, the $280 
million facility was designed to increase total port capacity by 2.5 million tons 
(The Port of Baltimore 1989 Annual Report). Seagirt certainly will not 
achieve this capacity in the near future. It therefore represents short-term 
overcapacity· 
While exhibiting negative container cargo growth and recently 
opening the $280 million mega-facility on 114 acres of dredged fill, can the 
Port of Baltimore justify the proposed redevelopment of the Dundalk 
Facility? Perhaps, the following capacity analysis could be used to answer this 
question. 
Results of the capacity calculations here reveal that with existing cargo 
throughputs, approximately 3.5 berths are required with a yard requirement 
of 173 acres for container storage. Currently, Dundalk operates six berths and 
285 acres of yard storage. Given the berth productivity increase of 111,295 
TEUs, the potential throughput represents the highest attainable productivity. 
This potential is not constrained by land or berth space and is possible given 
existing facility dimensions. The current excess in the Dundalk facility is 
demonstrated within Table 7 and Figure 8. The validity of this capacity is 
reinforced by historical cargo throughputs. In 1985, Dundalk was at capacity 
operating levels when cargo approached 700,000 TEUs. 
At 56 percent, the excess in Dundalk is not of major concern on a state 
or regional policy level. Due to fluctuating market conditions, this capacity 
may be desirable. But, the adjacent Seagirt facility can handle up to 2.5 
million tons of container cargo. Most of this cargo has yet to be seen or 
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TABLE7 
CAPAOTY CALCULATION FOR DUNDALK MARINE TERMINAL 
(PORT OF BALTIMORE) 
EXISTING FACILITIES: 
JlERDIS YARD ACRES 1989TEU• TEUMNK 
6 285 427992 1 
4 )TOTAL CAPACITY 667,TlO TEUt 
Average Berth Requirement= .423 
Average TEUs per Line = 52,500 
1) #of Model Ship Lines= 8.15; 427,992 TEUs /52500 TEUs 
2) Total Berth Requirement = 3.45 berths; 8.15 Unet• .423 
3) Yard Requirement= 173 Acret; 3.45 berths•so acre• 
4) Potential Throughput 
LandUae 
Effidenc;y 
TEUs/Acre 
1502 
6 bertht • 111,295 TEUs/berth/year ., 667,770 TEU1/year 
5) # of Lines After Potential Increase 
667,770 TEUs I 52,500 TEUs = 12.7 Model lines 
6) Berth Requirement for Potential Inaeate 
12.7 lines •. 423 = 5.4 berths 
7) Yard Requirement for Potential Increase 
5.4 berths • 50 acres = 269 
SoW'ce: Port of Baltimore and author's calculations 
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committed. The enormous capacity potential betweert Dundalk and Seagirt is 
largely under-utilized and does represent a public concern. Even with a 56 
percent productivity boost, existing facilities would be able to handle cargo 
increases. These results demonstrate the possibility that further significant 
development in the port represents unnecessary over-investment and social 
cost. 
The Port of Norfolk 
Located in Norfolk Virginia, Norfolk International Terminals (NIT) 
represents an example of successful state port management. In 1989 with 
427,177 TEUs, the port is ranked second among the the other large ports 
studied. Hampton Roads, of which Norfolk is a part, has shown a five year 
growth rate of 128 percent. Norfolk has contributed significantly to this 
growth as it represents 60 percent of the business in Hampton Roads. 
In 1981, the ports in Virginia imposed integrated management on 
themselves. Facilities combined their resources and eliminated duplication 
and inefficiency. Rather than plan for expansion in a disjointed fashion, 
productivity improvements were made on a broad level. The Neptune 
computer system was developed in 1986 and provided shippers, agents and 
other port users with shared data. This cooperation helped to improve 
operating efficiencies and cargo movements. 
Another productivity improvement made in Norfolk was the 
acquisition of double-hoist container cranes. Double-hoist capability allow~ 
crane productivity to be improved from 25 lifts per hour to 50 lifts per hour 
(Container News, 1988). These improvements, which are regarded as 
innovative, contribute greatly to the success of Norfolk. 
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Another innovation was the development of the Virginia Inland Port 
(VIP). The port serves as a cargo storage and intermodal transfer facility 
between trucks and rail cars. Located inland from the port, it allows better 
p<>Sitioning of cargo destined for and from Midwest locations. VIP has a 
direct rail link to Norfolk and allows for more storage capability without 
additional coastal development. By developing VIP, Virginia has facilitated 
inland cargo transfer, reduced stress on existing coastal capacity, bypassed 
additional coastal land use, and saved expense with inland as opposed to 
coastal development. All of these factors contribute to success in land use and 
in the prevention of wasteful excess. 
Growth in Norfolk is planned on 11 acres of wetlands on the north end 
of the facility. A mitigation plan has been approved by the Army Corps of 
Engineers for this development. The results of capacity review indicate that, 
with a five-year 128 percent growth rate, this expansion can be justified. By 
incorporating capacity analysis with environmental considerations, 
permitting agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers, can better satisfy 
the criteria of permits required for dredge and fill activities under section 401 
of the Clean Water Act. Capacity analysis can ifldicate the need for 
development, which satisfies requirements of the permit (See Table 8 and 
Figure 9). 
Port of Charleston (North Charleston Terminal) 
The North Charleston Terminal is located 90 minutes from the m9uth 
of Charleston Harbor on the Cooper River. North Charleston handled 
261,177 TEUs in 1989 ranking fifth among the seven facilities studied. With 
three container berths and 185 yards for container storage, the facility has a 
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TABLES 
CAPACITY CALCUA TION FOR lHE PORT OF NORFOLK 
EXISTING FACILmES: LAND USE 
EFFICIENCY 
BERTIIS YARD ACRES 1989 TEUs TEU RANK TEUs/ACRE 
4 479 411177 2 858 
')TOTAL CAPACITY 445,180 TEUS 
Average Berth Requirement= .423 
Average TEUs per Line = 52500 TEUs 
1) #of Model Ship Lines = 7.83; 
411,177TEU/ 52,SOOTEUs 
2) Total Berth Requirement • 3.3 Berths 
7 .83 lines• .423 
3) Yard Requirement• 166 Acres 
3.3 berths• 50 acres 
4) Potential Throughput • '45,180 TEUs 
4 berths• 111,295 TEUs/berth/year 
5) # of Llnes After Potential Increase = 8.48 Model lines 
445,180 TEUs I 52,500 TEUs 
6) Berth Requirement for Potential Increase "" 3.6 berths 
8.48 Model lines• .432 
7) Yard Requirement for Potential Increase= 179 acres 
Source: Port of Norfolk and author's calculations 
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total existing capacity of 333,886 TEUs per year. This capacity requires 2.10 
berths and 105 acres of back-up storage. These figures indicate excess capacity 
of about 28 percent. Even with potential increases realized, existing 
infrastructure is sufficient to handle new cargo throughputs (See Table 9 and 
Figure 10). 
Development plans in North Charleston include two additional berths 
for container cargo and other cargo types. Historic container growth 
demonstrates that North Charleston facility has increased its share of regional 
container cargo to 13 percent of the market in 1989 with signs of continuing 
improvement in the early 1990s. (See Table 3, p. 40). 
Its land use efficiency ranks fourth overall, which is relatively efficient. 
The acceptable efficiency, typical amount of excess, limited future 
development and continuing container cargo growth indicate that 
overcapacity may not be a social concern at the North Charleston container 
facility. Due to the multi-use nature of the facility, the additional berths to be 
developed may be justified, given the indications of growth in the facility. 
Port of Charleston (Wando Terminal) 
The Wando Terminal is located one hour from Charleston Harbor on 
the Wando River. Its three developed berths handle more cargo per berth 
than any of the other six container facilities. The modern practices and 
location of this facility result in a highly efficient container facility. 
The Wando Terminal represents the highest productivity among the 
ports studied. This productivity is based upon the Number of TEUs handled 
per acre and per berth. It is a conservative standard for all facilities in the 
region. As competitive ports with similar practices and facilities, it is 
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TABLE9 
CAPAOTY CALCULATION FOR THE NORTH CHARLESTON TERMINAL 
(PORT OF CHARLESTON) 
EXISTING FACIUTIES: LAND USE 
EFFICIENCY 
BERTIIS YARD ACRES 1989 TEUs TEU RANK TEUs/ACRE 
3 192 261177 5 1360 
TOTAL CAPACITY 333,886 TEUs 
Average Berth Requirement= .423 
Average TEUs per Line = 52,500 TEUs 
1) #of Model Ship Lines = 4.975 
261177 TEUs/ 52,500 TEUs 
2) Total Berth Requirement • 2.10 berths 
4.975 Model lines• A23 
3)Yard Requirement= 105 acres 
2.10 berths • SO aaes 
4) Potential Throughput • 333,886 TEUs 
3 berths• 111295 TEUs/berth/year 
5) # of Lines After Potential Increase = 6.36 Model lines 
333,886 TEUs/ 52,500 TEUs 
6) Berth Requirement for Potential Increase • 2.69 berths 
6.36 lines • .423 
7) Yard Requirement after Potential lnaease • 135 aaes 
2.69 berths • SO aaes 
Source: Port of Charleston and author's calculations 
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assumed that all of the ports could be as productive per berth as the most 
productive competitor. 
The Wando standard is conservative becaµse it does not exhibit extra 
ordinary productivity for a container port and it does not hold an advantage 
in total cargo handled compared to the other ports. In fact, W ando is ranked 
fourth in total container cargo handled. Because it is the benchmark facility, 
it is assumed that there is no overcapacity at Wando (See Table 10). Although 
there may be excess in the facility, for the purposes of this analysis, it will not 
be a factor. As the most productive port in the study range, Wando represents 
the most efficient facility that society can obtain at this time. In other words, 
while there may be some additional excess at Wando, the perfectly efficient 
container facility does not exist and so W ando represents the next best 
alternative. 
The Port of Savannah (Containerport) 
Containerport is located on the Savannah River, northwest of 
Savannah. The 245-acre container facility captured almost 20 percent of the 
regional market share and ranked third overall in total container cargo. 
Similarly, Containerport's land use efficiency ranked second. 
Total capacity was 556,475 TEUs, and in 1989, the facility handled 
372,876 TEUs. This represents a total excess of 49 percent. The facility 
currently operates five berths with 245 acres of container storage. Berth 
requirements for its potential cargo increase are 4.5 with a yard requirement 
of 224 acres (See Table 11 and Figure 11). 
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TABLE10 
CAPAOlY CALCULATION FOR lHE WANDO TERMINAL 
(PORT OF CHARLESTON) 
EXISTING FACILITIES: 
BERnIS YARD ACRES 1989TEUs 
3 150 333886 
Average Berth Requirement = .423 
Average TEUs per Line= 52,500 TEUs 
1) #of Model Ship Lines = 6.36 Lines 
333,886 TEUs/ 52,SOOTEUs 
2) Total Berth Requirement • 2.69 Berths 
6.36 Llnes • .423 
3) Yard Requirement• 135 acres 
2.69 berths • 50 acres 
LAND USE 
EFFICIENCY 
TEU RANK TEUa/ ACRE 
4 2226 
Source: Port of Charleston and author's calculations 
75 
RANK 
1 
TABLEll 
CAPAOTY CALCULATION FOR CONT AINERPORT 
(PORT OF SAVANNAH) 
EXISTING FACILITIES: LAND USE 
EFFICIENCY 
BERTIIS YARD ACRES 1989 TEUs TEU RANK TEUs/ ACRE 
5 245 372876 3 1522 
TOTAL CAPACITY 556,475 TEUs 
Average Berth Requirement = .423 
Average TEUs per Line= 52,500 TEUs 
1) #of Model Ship Lines= 7.10 
372,876 TEUs/ 52,500 TEUs 
2) Total Berth Requirement= 3 berths 
7.10 Model lines• .423 
3) Yard Requirement• lSO acres 
3 berths • SO acres 
4) Potential Throughput= 556,475 TEUs 
S berths • 111295 TEUs 
5) # of Lines After Potential Increase = 10.6 Model Unes 
556,475 TEUs/52,500 TEUs 
6) Berth Requirement for Potential Increase • 4.S berths 
10.6 Lines • .423 
7) Yard Requirement after Potential Increase • 224 aaes 
4.S berths • SO acres 
Source: Port of Savannah and author's calculations 
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I I 
Containerport has shown continuing growth in the 1980s with an eight 
percent cargo increase from 1989 to 1990 (Table 3, p. 40). The excess in the 
facility does suggest that Containerport is not in need of future expansions for 
container cargo. Despite its excess, developments planned for Containerport 
include the addition of a sixth berth plus 42 acres of storage space at the ocean 
city facility, which is where Containerport is located. As a multi-use facility 
that handles break-bulk and bulk in addition to container cargoes, the 
development of one extra berth may be justified to handle all cargo efficiently. 
In addition, total container capacity may be slightly overstated in the analysis 
due to the multi-use nature of the facility. Therefore, 49 percent excess is not 
alarming in this facility. Further, the exhibited growth and efficiency of the 
facility indicate that problematic overcapacity may not be evident at 
Containerport in Savannah. 
The Port of Jacksonville (Talleyrand and Blount Island Terminals) 
The Talleyrand Marine Terminal is a multi-use facility located twenty-
one miles from the Atlantic Ocean on the St. Johns River. It is a 156 acre 
facility that handles containers, bulk, autos, and break-bulk cargoes. The 
Blount Island Terminal is nine miles from the Atlantic Ocean and includes 
870 total acres of port facilities. Due to the relatively small amount of 
container cargo handled in both Blount Island and Talleyrand, these facilities 
were combined as a single unit operated by the Port of Jacksonville for the 
purposes of this study. The excess shown in Jaxport may reflect some loss of 
efficiency in container operations as a result of two separate facilities that are 
fairly close in distance. 
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The combined number of containers in 1989 for the Blount Island and 
Talleyrand Terminals was 128,090 TEUs. This gave Jaxport a 6.62 percent 
share of the regional market. Container facilities within the port included 
eight total berths with 228 yards of container storage. 
The calculated capacity in Jaxport is 565,957 TEUs annually. Excess 
capacity, therefore, is shown to be 77 percent. It should be noted that the 
proved excess in this study does not consider how container storage is used by 
other cargoes in a multi-use facility. This limited perspective may, therefore, 
overstate total excess. Nevertheless, a proved excess capacity with regard to 
container cargo to some degree exists (See Table 12 and Figure 12). 
Container cargo is continuing to increase within the port at a proven 
rate of 56 percent from 1989 to 1990 (See Table 3, p. 40). Development within 
the port involves the acquisition of three new cranes and some restructuring 
within the facility. Because the port has a competitive disadvantage among 
its competitors, such as Norfolk and Savannah, Jaxport has continued to 
focus on other types of cargoes. The specialization in autos, bulk and break-
bulk cargoes has given Jaxport success in these areas of trade. Although 
exhibiting a large degree of overcapacity with regard to container cargo, 
Jaxport has attempted to utilize its land by pulling resources away from 
containers and moving them toward other cargo operations and marketing. 
Although demonstrating some success in other areas of trade, there exists a 
large degree of overcapacity within the port that is not necessary for the 
purposes of trade activity. 
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TABLE12 
CAPACITY CALCULATION FOR BLOUNT ISLAND AND TALLEYRAND 
TERMINALS (PORT OF JACKSONVILLE) 
EXISTING FACILITIES: LAND USE 
EFFICENCY 
BERTIIS YARD ACRES 1989TEU1 TEU RANK TEUll ACRE 
8 228 128090 6 
TOTAL CAPACITY 565,957 TEUS 
Average Berth Requirement= .423 
Average TEUs per Line= 52,500 TEUs 
1) #of Model Ship Lines = 2.44 Lines 
128,()')0 TEUs I 52,500 TEUs 
2) Total Berth Requirement• 1.03 Berths 
2.44 Lines • .423 
3) Yard Requirement• 52 aaes 
1.03 berths• 50 acres 
4) Potential Throughput • 565,957 TEUs 
S berths• 111,295 TEUs/berth/year 
5) #of Lines after Potential Increase = 16.96 Lines 
565,957 TEUs/52,500 TEUs 
6) Berth Requirement for Potential lnaease • 4.6 berths 
10. 78 Unes • .423 
7) Yard Requirement after potential lnaease • 228 
4.6 berths • 50 acres 
Source: Port of Jacksonville and author's calculations 
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Capacity 
1 1 
OTIIER PORTS 
The 33 percent excess capacity among the seven container facilities in 
this study demonstrates a certain degree of overcapacity. This figure in itself 
is alarming given that average growth for container cargo in ports is eight 
percent (American Association of Port Authorities, 1990). Despite the excess 
ports continue to develop. In addition, there are at least ten smaller container 
facilities throughout the mid and south-Atlantic port range. The following 
identifies these ports and lists their respective container throughputs in 
TEUs. 
Chester 
Fernandina. Fl 
Gloucester City 
Miami 
Palm Beach 
Philadelphia 
Port Everglades 
Richmond. YA 
Wilmington. DE 
Wilmington.NC 
Total 
32,286 
35,818 
68,450 
337,961 
121,137 
80,674 
235,865 
26,001 
78,284 
99,031 
1,115,506 TEUs 
· Excluding these ten smaller ports, the seven large facilities that were 
studied have an excess of almost 1 million TEUs annual throughput. 
Therefore, the seven large ports as they exist today, could handle the 
combined cargo from the ten smaller ports. Here, significant overcapacity can 
be seen. 
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These figures raise some interesting policy questions regarding how to 
react to such over-supply. One approach could be to only distribute federal 
dredging funds to those ports which are successful. However, the commerce 
clause in the United States Constitution prohibits favoritism toward any one 
port. In fact, this is one of the major arguments against federal port control. 
An alternative approach is to tighten controls on development. The problem 
with development control is that no direct control mechanism now exists. 
Permit denials are based only upon environmental considerations and do not 
include the actual capacity needs of a port. Permit denials which neglect 
technical information on capacity needs can harm a port's ability to compete. 
A summary of the existing U.S. system shows that 131 public autonomous 
ports are competing against each other, which has resulted in vast 
overcapacity of container facilities without any federal mechanism to directly 
control the public waste of this over-supply (Wekh,1991). 
Throughout the previous discussions presented in this thesis, it has 
been suggested that a mandatory capacity and productivity analysis must be 
carried out by ports in conjunction with MARAD and used during permit 
review to fulfill the requirements of Sec 401 perinits, as outlined by EPA and 
the Army Corps of Engineers. Such an analysis can provide all the necessary 
information to port management and regulators so that proper planning and 
development can occur on a broad level. 
A comprehensive review could help prevent overcapacity without 
involving excessive federal control that may hamper a port's ability to 
compete. The need for measurement and analysis has been supported by the 
evidence shown of existing excess capacity along the mid-Atlantic port range, 
and by the proof of the increasing amount of development occurring despite 
the current excess. The need for capacity review is especially reinforced when 
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observing the added capacity excess of the many smaller container facilities 
outlined above. 
Figures 13 and 14 summarize the findings of the previous analysis. It is 
shown that total container handling capacity within the ports studied is 
approximately three million TEUs while actual cargo throughputs are 
approximately only two million TEUs. A 33 percent excess indicates that 
there is overcapacity at the facilities studied in the mid-Atlantic port region, 
individually and collectively. 
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FIGURE13 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis presented in the previous chapter demonstrates that there 
is excess capacity among container facilities in the ports of Baltimore, Norfolk, 
Charleston, Savannah and Jacksonville. Although it is not as high as it was 
previously thought to be (49 percent) by the author, overcapacity is growing as 
ports commit more of their resources to container facility development. 
Despite the proven 33 percent overall excess capacity at the ports studied, 
every port has planned or already begun development for the expansion of 
their container facilities. The large ports along the mid-Atlantic range have 
enough excess capacity to handle most of the cargo moving through smaller 
ports such as Brunswick and Newport News which were not included in this 
study. Future expansion represents significant public expenditure and coastal 
land development which may not be necessary. It is the responsibility of 
public policy-makers to eliminate public waste and prevent unnecessary costs 
to society. This thesis has shown that there may be a need for better 
management on a regional level. Specifically, it calls for: 
1) mandating capacity and productivity assessment by individual ports 
to justify development plans; 
2) disseminating information about individual port development 
requirements; 
3) sharing capacity information; 
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4) improving federal participation involving capacity assessments, and 
management and operations guidance from a stronger MARAD; 
and, 
5) Including technical information on development needs for 
federal, state and local permit reviews. 
The previous suggestions will facilitate information exchange among 
regulators and ports so that port development requirements can be included 
in permit decision-making. The availability of information will help ports 
assess their needs effectively and can help prevent unneeded development 
and overcapacity-a potential advantage to the port as well as to society. 
Welch (1991) states that only two ports in the entire South Atlantic are 
achieving successful economic returns. On both business and public levels, 
this is unacceptable. Economic inefficiencies coupled with a certain degree of 
overcapacity in public ports are obvious costs to society. 
The federal government has chosen to let the individual state ports 
govern their own development. In the competitive port industry, state rather 
than federal control has resulted in disjointed, inefficient management and 
unnecessary facility duplication. The only strong regulatory role of the 
federal government is dredging regulation. While the protection and 
preservation of the environment remains important, so does the economic 
success of existing port facilities. 
If the federal government took a more active role in the development 
of port facilities, it could promote development of financially and 
operationally efficient container facilities. Federal policy is necessary at this 
time. There are too many inefficient ports. There is too much excess. 
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Ports often publish their yearly revenue and the multiplier impacts of 
the port facility. This is misleading to the port community and to the nation. 
Revenues do not indicate the actual success of the port because all costs are 
not included. Including multiplier effects as a port benefit vastly overstates 
the total economic benefit of a port. Ports in the U.S. should all have positive 
rates of return. The indication, however according to Welch (1991), is that 
they do not. Changes must be made in management that will correct this 
inefficiency. It is imperative that public ports serve the public as valuable 
resources 
The costs of overcapacity discussed in this thesis are inefficiencies in 
public expenditure and coastal land use. This social problem is of national 
concern on many levels. Too often, ports see environmental regulations to 
development as hampering their ability to compete. Occasionally, this view 
may be warranted. However, protection of the environment is a national 
concern in addition to the economic benefits of international trade. There is 
also an inherent dichotomy between economic development and 
environmental protection. This does not need to be the case. National 
interests do include economic prosperity and environmental preservation at 
the same time. There can be a balance between the two that results in a 
positive net-benefit to society. It is more attainable if the federal government 
accommodates all of its interests with regard to port development and 
environmental protection. In this respect, more efficient management needs 
to be fostered by the federal government. By merely concerning itself with 
environmental regulations against development, the federal government 
only hampers a port's ability to compete and operate effectively. This is not 
efficient government. 
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Ports attempt to utilize their land and funds efficiently. But, the 
competitive nature of state-operated ports does not encourage intra-state 
planning and cooperation. Because there is neither cooperation nor 
communication among ports, duplication of facility occurs. This results in a 
slow, continuous process of overdevelopment. Negative net-returns can be 
the eventual result. 
In some countries, large "load-centers" are federally controlled to 
prevent overdevelopment and facility duplication. Considering the greater 
size of the U.S. and availability of its resources, more medium-sized efficient 
ports may provide for a better distribution of economic port benefits and 
better utilization of coastal lands. What is recommended is a policy of 
continued state control, but with greater federal involvement. While there is 
often conflict between state and federal goal-setting, cooperation is possible, as 
exhibited by the National Coastal Zone Management Program. 
To eliminate inevitable conflicts between state and federal 
governments, the federal role in port management should be to provide 
guidance through a better funded Maritime Administration-through 
standard mandatory capacity analysis an·d assistance in productivity 
management. The experts in MARAD can work directly with individual 
ports, replacing other inexperienced government organizations. 
This thesis has attempted to show the value of a capacity assessment to 
determine port requirements. On a broad scale, capacity results may be less 
accurate; but, individually, in-house analysis can be very precise when all the 
facts about operations are available. If all individual port capacity assessments 
were to be made available, unnecessary development may be avoided. 
Knowledge of port requirements and the trade role of individual ports along 
a range can result in better planning and management decision-making, and 
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more efficient use of port land and public funds. The resources saved can 
then be used to improve the productivity of existing facilities and to build 
financial success in each port. 
It has been suggested that U.S. ports operate inefficiently, with 
overcapacity and financial waste. This thesis has proved the existence of 
overcapacity in container facilities along the mid-Atlantic port range from 
Baltimore to Jacksonville. While capacity assessment does not provide a 
panacea for all the problems in the port industry, it does present port 
managers with the information necessary to make better decisions that can 
focus public port resources on existing facilities and away from waste. 
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